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BEYOND BOND MARKETS 2000:
THE ELECTRONIC FRONTIER AND
REGULATION OF THE CAPITAL
MARKETS FOR DEBT SECURITIES
STEPHEN WALLENSTEIN*
I
INTRODUCTION
On October 18-19, 1999, more than fifty securities lawyers, representatives
of ratings agencies, regulators, and academics gathered in Washington, D.C., for
a conference on the regulation of capital markets for debt securities. The conference, generously cosponsored by the Bond Market Foundation and the Duke
University Global Capital Markets Center, was organized by Executive Director Stephen Wallenstein of the Duke University School of Law and the Fuqua
School of Business. The purposes were to examine the characteristics of debt
capital markets and to assess the role of government policy and self-regulation
on the operation of these markets. The program was organized around the
following three topics:
1. Distinctive Features of Debt Markets;
2. Regulatory Issues Driven by Risk and Liquidity Considerations; and
3. Technology and the Regulation of Debt Markets
This article summarizes some of the recurrent themes and conclusions arising from deliberations by conference participants, and applies those themes and
conclusions in an examination of issues concerning electronic markets that have
emerged since the conference took place. We hope to move the debate beyond
the existing regulatory framework, to consider how recent technological developments necessitate a new approach to the regulation of corporate debt transactions. In the process, we relied on a complete transcript of the proceedings,
which omits the names of all participants in accordance with our agreement that
remarks would go unattributed. This article represents a synthesis of the
Copyright  2000 by Stephen Wallenstein
This article is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/63LCPWallenstein.
* Executive Director, Duke University Global Capital Markets Center; Senior Lecturing Fellow,
Duke University School of Law and Fuqua School of Business.
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stimulating and thoughtful ideas offered at the conference, and their application
to the ever-dynamic debt capital markets of today.
II
CORPORATE DEBT MARKETS AND SELF-REGULATION
Empirically, corporate bond markets have been one of the most understudied areas of the economy, especially relative to other assets prevalent in American capital markets. This theme was prominent in the discussions, as participants repeatedly noted the paucity of data that would be the building blocks for
research in this area. Reasons for this absence of information include lack of
centralized reporting of trades, lack of transparency, and the relatively small
size of the markets for exchange-traded bonds—a small fraction of the total
market—which predominantly trade over the counter. Many conference participants echoed regulators’ concern about the lack of information available to
anyone other than dealers and their institutional clients.
The institutional nature of corporate debt markets complicates attempts to
apply broad regulatory principles to this segment of the capital markets. Because institutions have substantial access to high-end advisory services, as well
as the recommendations of ratings agencies, they are far more sophisticated and
less vulnerable to misinformation than are retail investors. Because more than
four million individual debt securities are currently outstanding in the United
States, including government, corporate, municipal, mortgage, and asset-backed
debt (versus approximately ten thousand equity securities), bond advisory and
information services face a daunting task. This task is more difficult because
trading in the vast majority of these debt securities is quite infrequent. Moreover, administrative and information services must account for a greater number
of variables, such as time to maturity, coupon rate, and benchmark treasury
rates. In addition, external factors—such as dealer inventory and the size of a
purchase or sale in relation to the amount of that security outstanding—can
have a serious impact on bond prices in ways that are incompatible with regulatory paradigms based on an equity-style approach.
Furthermore, institutions enjoy a superior pricing power with respect to
their dealers, which allows them to purchase securities at lower bid/ask spreads.
The size of their transactions should permit the more knowledgeable institutions to force dealers closer to the margin on large corporate debt purchases.
The lack of transparency and reporting allows dealers to raise spreads beyond
what a more transparent market would permit. Moreover, antiquated purchasing methods have defined corporate bond markets, even as their equity
counterparts have modernized. Investors wanting to purchase a debt security
have had no choice but to call individual dealers by phone to learn the dealer’s
price and inventory. Nothing guarantees that two investors would receive the
same answer to that question. Despite these criticisms, however, the relatively
closed nature of corporate debt markets appears to have served institutional in-

WALLENSTEIN_FMT.DOC

Page 123: Summer 2000]

11/22/00 1:20 PM

BEYOND BOND MARKETS 2000

125

vestors effectively because of their ability to shop for the best price, and simultaneously to extract liquidity information from potential dealers.
Liquidity, which is determined by several key factors, affects the desire of
both dealers and investors to hold a given security. One of the major causes restricting the liquidity of corporate bonds is their limited client base. Because
corporate bonds are relatively heavily taxed at both the federal and state levels,
retail investors tend not to become major consumers of these instruments. This
is unlikely to change absent significant changes in the tax code. Retail investor
concern over asymmetric information, though of questionable justification, may
also limit their participation. And, because retail investors trade securities
more frequently than insurance companies and most pension funds, at least in
the equities market, their absence may contribute to the relative illiquidity of
debt markets. It should be noted, however, that retail bond investors predominantly buy and hold, instead of trade. In fact, because institutions, such as insurance companies, purchase corporate bonds to match their future liabilities,
bonds are placed in portfolios where they remain until maturity. This is vastly
different from equities, which are traded regularly on information about
changes in the issuer. This crucial determinant of liquidity stems more from exogenous factors—such as the nature of institutional investors and their own
objectives, and the tax laws—than from the microstructure of debt markets.
Thus, attempts to increase liquidity must be sensitive to the different markets,
types of issues, and the institutions participating in those markets.
III
NEW FRONTIERS: ELECTRONIC TRADING AND CORPORATE DEBT MARKETS
Currently, there are more than seventy online trading systems for debt securities, and in 1999, approximately six percent of fixed income trades occurred
online. BusinessWeek estimates that thirty-seven percent of all bond trades will
occur online by 2001.1 More significantly, Greenwich Associates reports that
eighty percent of institutional investors are either already trading bonds online
or considering doing so in the near future.2 This shift toward Internet trading
will have a significant impact on the market for corporate debt instruments, as
well as the regulatory framework applied to this market.
Electronic trading systems for fixed-income securities take several forms.
Regardless of their particular form, each system causes the trading process for
these instruments to be in line with electronic equity trading systems. There are
three basic types of systems: (1) the auction or bidding systems, in which dealers
and investors place direct bids on issues; (2) the secondary multi-dealer systems,
in which institutional clients trade with dealers but not with other investors; and
(3) the cross-matching systems, in which trades placed by both buyers and sell-

1. See Toddi Gutner, The e-Bond Revolution, BUSINESS WEEK, Nov. 15, 1999, at 270.
2. See Michael Casey, Fixed-Income Investors Turn to the Web to Trade, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9,
2000, at B17.
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ers are matched anonymously. As systems evolve through consultation and
beta-testing by dealers, they will likely converge into a unified platform that will
offer multiple capabilities to traders who desire attributes of all three systems.3
By aggregating execution capability, financial information, and other services into a single platform, electronic systems are enabling both institutional and
retail investors to conduct real-time transactions much more efficiently over the
Internet. Perhaps most important, these systems allow investors to examine
multiple debt offerings in a single location, whereas otherwise they would have
to contact individual dealers. Investors can place an order electronically with
their preferences, and receive bids either from dealers they select or from anyone holding inventory. Also, electronic interfaces provide users with the flexibility to screen issues according to their criteria, and to view them in comparison to benchmark U.S. treasuries, the swap curve, or other emerging
benchmarks, which play a central role in corporate bond pricing.
Online trading systems have the potential to close the gap in services available to institutional buyers and retail investors. By providing price and availability information on a physical screen, investors can be confident that they are
receiving the same information as others, thus perpetuating an expectation of
transparency without formal regulation. Institutional investors have stated that
they find the speed and convenience of electronic systems to be one of the more
important benefits to online trading, rather than any resulting price transparency and tightening of spreads. Electronic trading systems increase their capacity to manage a larger portfolio, to do so more efficiently, and to complete
more transactions than possible with existing dealer-based systems. The same
technology also radically increases the speed with which dealers may refresh
prices of a vast number of securities.
The features of online debt exchanges for corporate bonds can be designed
to provide a wealth of benefits to both issuers and investors. Issuers can use
these platforms to publish corporate information and to allow for real-time
pricing of securities. They also allow full online negotiation as well as manually
processed transactions. In addition, significant possibilities exist for issuers to
broadcast and publish messages to institutional and other investors, mitigating
the need to embark on costly and time-consuming roadshows for smaller offerings. Bloomberg and other existing Internet information providers already possess this capability. As trading systems advance, they will all provide these
benefits, and will allow electronic information to replace physical offering
documents currently mandated by regulatory institutions. As the industry
moves toward T plus 1 and straight-through processing, these systems also hold
the promise of significantly reducing back-office costs for both investors and
dealers.

3. The most recent ETS survey has been posted on the Bond Market Association’s website, where
it will be continuously updated. See The Bond Market Association, BondMarkets.Com (visited Oct. 12,
2000) <http://www.bondmarkets.com>.
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Electronic systems also give issuers the option of issuing their own debt offerings directly to investors, instead of working through a broker. Large corporations such as Ford, General Electric, and General Motors have already taken
advantage of this capability, replacing offerings they formerly handled by
phone. These transactions have become increasingly feasible because of their
relatively routine nature, because large corporations issue and refinance debt so
frequently. Dealers, though initially skeptical of potential revenue losses, now
appear to accept this outcome largely because of the razor-thin margins generated by large commercial offerings; dealer margins hover around 0.05%, versus
7% for equity offerings. They will find that greater revenues can be generated
by providing advisory services than by handling the sale of such routine securities.
Investors may benefit from the ability to view offerings from multiple issuers on a single screen that includes real time pricing, rates, and inventory. They
will also retain the ability to negotiate with dealers for the best spread, as well
as with the issuer on price and rate. Completing transactions electronically will
also save on execution and costs. Electronic systems may also align with thirdparty entities to provide rating and other advisory services so that debt markets
ultimately are more appealing to retail investors. If the market drives retail investors to an online platform, dealers will also benefit by having more time to
spend with institutional buyers instead of on retail accounts, and still benefit
from the liquidity these smaller buyers can provide at crucial times. Furthermore, electronic platforms can allow investors to gain significantly better returns than under the current physical systems. Because electronic platforms are
likely to narrow the spread on issues, investors will enjoy a noticeable increase
in their portfolio performance.
The emergence of electronic trading in the corporate debt markets will have
several important effects on the larger financial system. First, by increasing the
efficiency of the markets, U.S. dealers will be able to maintain a larger share of
the world debt market. Presently, the rapid growth of debt markets in Europe
threatens to cut into the U.S. share of overall offerings. Electronic platforms,
however, have the potential not only to allow the United States to maintain its
present market share, but also to attract new customers looking for the lowest
costs and most complete information. This greater transparency may make
fixed-income investing more attractive to various classes of investors, who
might otherwise be deterred from participating in markets that they perceive as
biased in favor of institutions. These developments could redound to the benefit of U.S. debt markets as well as the financial community generally.
Additionally, electronic systems may eventually provide a significant increase in overall market liquidity and lessen the risk of systemic shocks, such as
those that occurred in late 1998. The liquidity crisis in debt markets in the aftermath of the Long Term Capital Management collapse has still not fully
abated. By aggregating transactions in an electronic platform, all dealers and
investors will, in times of distress, be able to locate each other more quickly.
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This prospect is similarly appealing to institutional investors, who complain
about the decrease in dealer capital commitments, and the corresponding
dearth of liquidity, since 1998. Retail investors also may be attracted by greater
liquidity in smaller markets, where the vast majority of debt securities today
may trade no more than once per year, if that often.
Still, there are limitations on the capability of these systems to replace completely the existing infrastructure for corporate bond trading. Smaller issuers
may fear aftermarket retribution from dealers if they move their transactions to
web-based systems and cut the dealers out of the transaction. This would occur
if dealers were unwilling to commit capital by purchasing bonds in the aftermarket if they did not manage the deal and receive the fees that would have
come with it. As a result, issuers would find lower demand for their offerings,
which would depress prices enough to eliminate the savings accrued by managing the transaction online in the first place. Moreover, investors wanting to
move large blocks of debt quickly will still require the presence of large dealers
to place these orders without upsetting the equilibrium in the market and depressing the price. The success of electronic systems, both those founded by
existing dealers and those founded by independent owners, will therefore hinge
on their ability to interact efficiently with the existing infrastructure.
Online trading systems hold great potential for corporate debt markets. The
realization of that potential depends largely on the success of dealers and issuers working with regulators to extend the self-regulatory principles of existing
platforms to evolving electronic systems. It is crucial that efforts not be made to
differentiate between online and offline markets. These two markets are rapidly converging, so that any regulatory action runs a serious risk of hindering
their growth and efficiency. Any regulatory action would also discourage cooperation between dealers and other service and information providers, a necessary component of maturity in this market.
IV
REGULATORY IMPLICATIONS
The significant structural changes brought about by Internet trading platforms have important implications for efforts to regulate capital markets for
corporate debt. Efforts to align debt markets more closely with their equity
counterparts need to be reevaluated in the context of the trading environment.
Regulators should generally seek to provide market participants with the flexibility to develop the most efficient offering and trading procedures allowed by
technological innovation. Uncertainty is currently at a high point, and regulators must resist the temptation to manage this uncertainty with new restrictions
on transactions or additional requirements for dealers.
Transparency concerns, one of the most critical areas of debate for the past
decade, have been obviated as large dealers have moved to participate fully in
online bond trading. Dealers have steadfastly challenged the details of government proposals for operational changes to facilitate corporate bond price
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transparency through dissemination of transaction reports to the public. But a
new regime that accommodates at least some of the dealers’ concerns about the
impact on liquidity may be approved by the SEC in the near future. As the
marketplace has brought a higher level of disclosure than was initially thought
practicable, the relevance of this expected action is questionable. Dealer cooperation in the development of electronic platforms demonstrates their commitment to transparency, even though it may have negative results for them financially. Their continued collaboration will ultimately hinge on their right to
continue to operate under self-regulation.
Ratings agencies and other third-party service providers will continue to
play a vital role in transmitting information to investors. As dealers increasingly adapt their business models to provide high-end advisory services to institutional clients, more traditional functions will be left to other firms, who will in
turn find a growing market for their services. Service providers will emerge to
serve all classes of investors with the type of information most relevant to their
investing needs, all facilitated by dealers’ willingness to partner with online providers. Self-regulation will become more attractive for all parties, as newly
transparent systems allow for more precise reporting and monitoring activity.
Rules must be developed to ensure that information is made available in such a
manner that it will not harm investors or dealers by divulging their positions too
quickly, but still will allow fair access to transaction information.
Electronic systems provide the immediate benefit of increasing liquidity for
all investors, thus narrowing spreads and making debt markets more accessible
to retail investors. Issuers will soon find a larger market for their offerings, as
more diverse investors are attracted to debt securities. More competition
should also lead to more attractive prices. Because liquidity has long been a
central goal of regulatory efforts, continuing self-regulation of markets as they
migrate toward an electronic platform will best serve the goals of both issuers
and investors.
The continued viability of self-regulatory organizations will provide important fuel for the growth of these electronic markets. The rise of third-party information providers, in addition to ratings agencies, will ensure democratic dissemination of information without regulatory interference. Today’s trading
networks must provide efficient execution and liquidity or they will not survive;
the competitive nature of the market forces service providers to fight for customers with service and information, because spreads have narrowed, and fees
have fallen to near zero.
Perhaps the most significant challenge to electronic debt markets lies in the
future. While online platforms have been developed during strong economic
times, we have yet to experience electronic trading in the context of a prolonged
economic downturn. One can presume, though, that lessons from the liquidityinduced crisis of 1998 will ensure that dealers and investors alike will take advantage of the opportunity to centralize their operation in a single platform that
provides extra security to all parties. Anonymous systems will eventually make
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it easier to test the market without divulging one’s current holdings or desire to
purchase; such discretion is a valuable opportunity in fragile markets.
Future uncertainty over dealer capital commitments also compounds attempts to predict the future of this market. Markets may evolve in such a way
that sufficient volume provides liquidity without large commitments from dealers. This, however, may be seriously tested in more volatile times. The dealer’s
role in Internet-based markets will change drastically as margins continue to
evaporate and spreads narrow to the point where it becomes unprofitable for
dealers to enter the market on their own behalf. More likely, they will develop
more specialized products to meet the financing needs of their issuer clients
while simultaneously adopting a more advisory role with institutional investors.

